What does it mean for a statement to ‘ring true’. It maybe that the statement is corroborated by many other facts that we instantly and consciously recall, but it might also be that this sense of truth comes from a correlation between the statement and the conceptual frames it evokes in our unconscious. Frames which possibly have become deeply entrenched through repeated use. Bringing these conceptual frames to the surface where they can be analysed and questioned is one of the uses that frame theory can be put to.
There are many excellent introductions to frame theory (Fillmore, 2006; Evans and Green, 2006; Lakoff, 2004|2014) so it seems unneccesary to rehearse them again here. But for those who have not come across this idea of frames before, Lakoff provides a useful introductory description:
Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result, they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions. In politics our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames is to change this. Reframing is social change.
You can’t see or hear frames. They are part of what we cognitive scientists call the “cognitive unconscious”—structures in our brains that we cannot consciously access, but know by their consequences. What we call “common sense” is made up of unconscious, automatic, effortless inferences that follow from our unconscious frames.
Lakoff, 2004|2014, xi–xii
Lakoff goes on to explain how we can also know frames through language. A corresponding frame is activated every time one uses a word. Framenet (https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/) is a fascinating resource which describes in language the conceptual frames operating in relation to words (or more precisely lexical units). This for example is the part of the description framenet provides for ‘invading’:
The Invader enters a Land in an aggressive attempt to cripple or dominate its people and its government.
Framenet, Lexical Unit Index, ‘Invading’
This may seem like little more than a definition, but the framenet analysis goes much deeper that this as it identifies a number of ‘frame elements’. So for ‘invading’ there are two ‘core’ frame elements: the invader, and the land. But there are also many more ‘non core’ elements such as: means, path, source, iterations, purpose, and so forth. The key thing here is that frames are flexible because these frame elements can be filled in, or populated differently. So land can be filled-in with Ukraine, for example. And when a frame is activated this whole network of frame elements are potentially activated also.
If there is an attempt to activate the invading frame in relation to those immigrants on ‘small boats’ crossing the English Channel it seems relatively straightforward, although I would argue mistaken, to fill in many of these frame elements. According to such a framing, the invaders are the immigrants, the land is the United Kingdom, the means are the small boats, the path is the route across the channel, the source is the Atlantic coasts of France and Belgium as well as the countries the people on the small boats originally came from, the iteration is the regularity of the crossings made by small boats (which is not constrained by any fixed number), the purpose is the safety and perhaps economic security of those making the crossing.
Why is this framing mistaken? For one reason because the small boat crossings are non-aggressive; there is not at attempt to violently breach the defences of the UK, in many cases the asylum seekers are rescued mid-channel by UK organisations. Neither is there an attempt to ‘cripple or dominate’ the people and government of the UK. What is more, there are other ways in which the issue of small boat crossings could be framed, ‘escaping’ perhaps? Escaping has many of the same frame elements as ‘invasion’ but there are additional elements such as undesirable location which provides the motivation for the need to escape, and there is not the same focus on aggression and domination as that evoked by the ‘invasion’ frame. Interestingly, the invasion frame provides little scope for sympathy with respect to the invader, while the ‘escaping’ frame does potentially allow us to be sympathetic to the plight of the escapee. Consequently it is easy to see why an invading framing might be desirable for someone with an anti-immigration agenda. In contrast the escaping frame draws more attention to the escapee than to the place and situation to which they hope to escape to. But equally, accepting this framing is more nuanced, it does not entail us having to accept the escapee’s case as valid. Frame elements such as explanation and means provide space to question and challenge the motivations of the escapee. For example, is low income in one country a sufficient explanation for adopting the means of hiring people traffikers to utilize small boats to cross the channel in a risky and life-threatening venture? Possibly yes, possibly no, depending on level of poverty, and desperation experienced.
Similarly, from the point of view of the country being invaded, all invaders should be repelled, but from the viewpoint of the country in which asylum is sought, it does not follow that all escapees should be sent away, or all invited to stay. This depends on a case by case evaluation of the undesirable situation the escapees are seeking refuge from.
Hopefully this example provides some indication of the importance and power of framing. However this only scratches the surface of the potential that Lakoff’s conceptual framework provides. So by way of a partial introduction here are three concepts that flesh out a little more the extent of his thinking.
Reflexivity
Many of us have grown up thinking that the world is outside of us, something existing independently of us that we have to come to understand. The conceptual framings that we develop through our neural circuitry help us in this regard to make sense of the world around us. These conceptual framings may help us to define this world but they also place constraints on our understanding. These constraints might not be too concerning in terms of what happens to the world, until one realises that our neuronal circuitry and the conceptual frames that emerge are a part of this world, not isolated from it. Consequently the conceptual frames that we develop have real-world consequences through the actions we take as individuals and communities. In this way the world can come to reflect the conceptual frames that we project onto it. Now consider living and growing up in this cultural world defined by frames existing largely at the unconscious level.
As Lakoff notes;
This phenomenon is called reflexivity. The world reflects our understandings through our actions, and our understandings reflect the world shaped by the frame-informed actions of ourselves and others.
Lakoff, 2004|2014, p.35
He goes on to point out that reflexivity in itself can be either good or bad, also that it is down to us to use frames, and perhaps develop new ones, that lead to beneficial outcomes for communities, societies, and the environment. It follows that reflexivity is also a powerful tool that could be exploited to the benefit of particular individuals or power groups rather than the broader interests of societies. If one understands the world through frames that are beneficial to a dictator, or ruling elite, for example, one begins to appreciate how hegemony operates. Those operating within a pattern of reflexivity aligned to a the values and interests of a ruler do not need to be coerced into taking actions—actions that may even be against their own self-interest—they will do so because of their understanding of the way the world is. An understanding underpinned through conceptual frames operating largely unconsciously.
Biconceptualism
We might expect to think and act in coherent and consistent ways guided by our stable and unwavering moral beliefs. In actuality many ‘operate on different—and inconsistent—moral systems in different areas of thier lives. The technical term is “biconceptualism”’ (Lakoff 2004|2014, p.xiv). But what of the struggle we might expect to experience from entertaining two different moral systems? Lakoff explains how such clashes might be resolved at the level of neural circuitry. So, for example, two conflicting systems can be controlled through ‘mutual inhibition’ so that if one system is active the other is turned off. In addition there is the possibility of ‘neural binding’ where clashes are avoided since each conflicting system is only activated in relation to different and separate concerns.
Biconceptualism might seem like a technical and somewhat irrelevant idea to the behaviour of the electorate. But consider how it might explain the volativity of voters; the way voters previously on the left or right are persuaded to vote for parties diametrically opposite to their former positions. Such voting behaviour could be explained by biconceptualism, since voters might have a moral system that aligns predominantly with those associated with, say the left, but at the same time hold views about a certain issue, driven by a different moral system more associated with the right. If this second issue becomes central in importance to the voter it is easy to see how this might sway voting decisions in unexpected ways.
Hypocognition
What is that feeling when you want to argue a point but you find yourself making a long, vague and unfocused argument? As Lakoff says:
There’s a phenomenon you have probably noticed. A conservative on TV uses two words, like tax relief. And the progressive has to go into a paragraph-long discussion of his own view. The conservative can appeal to an established frame, […] But there is no established frame on the other side.
Lakoff, 2004|2014, p.21
This absence of an established idea or frame that can be summoned in support of one’s thinking is called hypocognition. By way of an example, the broadcaster, Piers Morgan recently challenged two UK political party leaders with the same question ‘Can a woman have a penis?’. Such yes or no questions are often problematic for interviewees as issues often do not fall into stark binary categories. In this case, there is a familiar long-standing framing for both women and men, which might lead to the unconscious ‘common sense’ conclusion that a woman cannot have a penis. But what about when the self-identity of a human with a penis is genuinely that of a woman? It is more difficult to find a one or two word term that evokes a well-established frame that structures this complexity. Consequently, both party leaders found themselves having to make nuanced and complicated arguments that risk sounding inauthentic or like dissembling. Admittedly, one leader was more forthright than the other (he answered ‘yes’ directly), but both faced the same problem of hypocognition in that there is the lack of an established frame that structures the complexity that falls out of the interchange between biological categorisations of sex and cultural stereotypes of gender. A frame that might accommodate greater diversity and provide more fluid categorisation.
Hopefully this provides some indication of the ways that framing can impact our political thinking, however in only a few hundred words it is impossible to capture the depth of Lakoff’s analysis. While some aspects of this work have become more controversial over the intervening years—the functioning of mirror neurons for example—the relevance of his argumentation seems more pertinent than ever. The following sections of the essay applies some of this thinking to examples of graphic communication in history.