Parts and wholes

When we choose one thing to represent an object, idea, event, emotion, or anything, there are a number of options open to us. Amongst all these possibilities is the option (i) to either make the representation resemble the form of the thing we are choosing to represent, or (ii) taking just a part of the thing to represent, and making this stand for the whole. For example, I could craft a model of a plane from a plastic kit, or alternatively, take the aircraft’s propellor and use this to evoke the plane in its entirety. I could of course, do another thing, make a model of the propellor and use this as a representation..

Such representations—in which we use something from the same conceptual domain to stand for the thing we are attempting to represent—are examples of metonymy. There can be multiple metonymic associations in any single case of representation, so using terms elaborated in Littlemore (2015), the model of the propellor is both, ‘a modified form for original form’ metonymy and ‘a part for whole’ metonymy. The form of the model propellor is inevitably slightly different to the original form of the actual propellor that it represents, it might be identical in every way except that it is scaled down perhaps. Once we recognise that it is a model of a propellor we might infer that the model propellor is part of a larger model, but equally we could infer that this model is a representation of an actual propellor that is part of an actual aeroplane.

To further complicate things, the model of the propellor could be based on a unique individual aeroplane, perhaps Lindbergh’s Spirit of St Louis, that made the first transatlantic flight in 1927, or, we might take the propellor as a representation of flight in general. If we take it as a representation of flight in general this introduces another metonymic mapping, where a member of a category the propellor, stands for the whole category—powered flight, perhaps. I say perhaps here because there could be other categories, record-breaking journeys, for example, that are equally relevant. And there is nothing to stop us making all of these associations, where we think about the Spirit of St Louis, powered flight and record-breaking journeys all at once.

To return to the Lego model of the Willis Tower, ‘a modified form for original form’ metonymic mapping seems particularly appropriate. Here the form of the Willis Tower has been simplified and reduced in scale such that it can be rendered in Lego. The substance of which the actual tower is made—steel, glass, etc—is not represented in the Lego model, yet the more abstract idea of building, using composite elements that are brought together to make a pre-determined form, is suggested by the Lego model.

The point of all of this is to highlight that the meanings we associate with something as simple as a model of a tower, can be complex, depending on the amount of attention that we expend on processing the representation in question. Furthermore, these meanings are not fixed or pre-determined, but based on the associations we make in the moment. That does not mean that the Lego model can mean just anything, since we have learned to make meaning in similar ways to each other, and we use similar bodies and brains to perceive and process the representation. We are also often interested in what the maker of a representation is trying to say to us. These things motivate us to find shared meanings.

This may all seem like an esoteric set of concerns, but the relationship of parts and wholes is fundamental, so much so that there is a branch of philosophy, mereology, dedicated to it. As designers we make whole things out of parts, so being alert to the potentials that an understanding of parts/wholes brings could be useful to our practice.

There are many ways in which one thing can stand for (represent) another. Too many to list here.

Focusing on the Lego model. An object can be represented by a modified version of the object’s form. A 3d tower represented by the modified form of a 3d Lego model, but equally, the tower could be represented by the modified form of a 2d photograph. A photo of the Lego model is consequently a representation of a representation.

A metonym is when the representation shares the same conceptual domain as the thing represented. Both model and tower share the conceptual domain of building.

An important group of metonymical mappings are based on part/whole, or whole/part relationships. The number ’10’ on the door of the Prime Minister’s residence in Downing Street might stand for the whole building and everyone working in it (part/whole), conversely stating that ‘we are awaiting confirmation from Downing Street’ uses the whole street to stand for a group of decision makers working within it (whole/part).